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Physical activity to prevent obesity in young children
Negative outcome or protocol problem?
Editor—Although the article by Reilly et al
on physical activity to prevent obesity in
young children emphasises that adherence
to protocol was good,1 an interview with
Reilly on the Today programme (7.20 am,
6 October 2006) cited the difficulty in
getting children to increase their activity as
much as required—that is, not a negative
outcome, but a problem in achieving
sufficient increase to make the intervention
effective. Which was the case?
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BMI in the BMJ
Editor—Reilly et al entitle their article,
“Physical activity to prevent obesity . . .” and
conclude, “Alternative inter-
ventions [to physical activity]
to prevent obesity in young
children are required.”1 The
emphasis on a lack of impact
of physical activity on obesity
is unfortunate for four
reasons.
Firstly, the independent
variable was not successfully
manipulated: the interven-
tion failed to generate differ-
ences in physical activity or sedentary
behaviour between groups. Why would one
expect a “physical activity intervention”
which has no impact on physical activity to
alter energy balance or “obesity”?
Secondly, the principal outcome meas-
ure, body mass index (BMI), is an inappro-
priate measure of obesity for two reasons.
Studies of obesity should focus on body
composition, rather than measures of body
weight (BMI). We, like Reilly et al, observed
no differences in weight or BMI in
supervised exercise studies in obese chil-
dren.2 However, dual energy x ray absorpti-
ometry (DEXA) showed significant
decreases in central fat mass. Weight and
BMI did not concomitantly change because
lower limb muscle mass increased. We also
observed improvements in euglycaemic
hyperinsulinaemic clamps and vascular
function with training (A M Thompson et al,
14th annual scientific meeting, Australasian
Society for the Study of Obesity, Adelaide,
October 2005).2 A review of DEXA studies
in obese children showed similar counter-
vailing impacts of exercise on fat and lean
body mass.3 A conclusion of no impact on
obesity based on lack of change in BMI is
misleading.
BMI corrects for individuals who are
heavy because they are tall, a valid concept
in cross sectional population comparisons.
However, in within subject longitudinal
experiments, change in BMI reverts to a
measure of change in weight because
interventions do not alter height. Using
weight as an index of obesity is flawed
(above). In children, change in BMI is not
even a valid measure of weight change
because height also changes. Reilly et al did
not include data on changes in height or
weight or on waist girth.
Thirdly, no amount of statistical manipu-
lation alters the fundamental fact that BMI is
not a measure of obesity (adiposity) and
change in BMI within subjects is not a proxy
for change in obesity.
Finally, BMI may be prac-
tical, precise, and easy to col-
lect, but these characteristics
do not make it a valid
measure of obesity in this
context.
Research studies funda-
mentally need to manipulate
an independent variable and
measure the impact on a
legitimate dependent vari-
able. The study of Reilly et al failed on both
counts. The paper generated widespread
and unfortunate, but understandable, inter-
national media attention.4 Exercise remains
a key interventional strategy for the man-
agement of obesity in young people.
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Dietary and behavioural modifications in
managing childhood obesity
Editor—The article by Reilly et al provided
conclusive evidence that other interventions
besides enhanced physical activity are
necessary for decreasing the BMI (body
mass index).1 The management of child-
hood obesity needs a multidimensional
approach including dietary modifications,
behavioural modifications, and physical
exercise. Only in conjunction with the
former two will physical activity have an
impact in reducing obesity. Dietary modifi-
cations include avoiding eating in restau-
rants, decreasing soft drink intake,2 decreas-
ing portion sizes, avoiding dried and calorie
rich foods, and increasing the fibre content
of diet. Behavioural modification strategies
include educating children and parents
about healthy diets, encouraging children to
keep food diaries and avoiding habits such
as eating while watching television.
Reinforcement of these strategies along with
regular physical exercise is likely to produce
significant results rather than using one
approach exclusively. The management of
childhood obesity is especially important to
prevent complications such as low self
esteem,3 hypertension, hyperlipidaemia,
sleep apnoea,4 slipped femoral epiphyses,5
and diabetes mellitus.
Besides it needs to be remembered that
though rare, there are genetic causes of
obesity—such as Alstrom syndrome and
Prader Willi syndrome—as well as endocrine
causes such as hypothyroidism that need to
be excluded before the above mentioned
approaches are used.
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Authors’ reply
Editor—Michell asks whether our out-
comes resulted from inadequate implemen-
tation of the intervention. The intervention
was well implemented, but marked and sus-
tained increases in physical activity were not
observed: the intensity of physical activity
sessions may have been less than achieved in
the pilot study.1 Alternatively, children may
have “compensated” for increased physical
activity by reduced physical activity at other
times,2 though this was not observed in our
pilot study.1 This emphasises the importance
of objective measures of physical activity:
subjective measures are biased.
Green and Cable, and Kapoor, question
the proposed mechanism for our interven-
tion. Increases in physical activity should
increase energy expenditure,3 and we aimed
to limit opportunities for eating by reducing
sedentary time.1 Focusing intervention on
one or two behaviours has usually been
more successful in obesity prevention than
the wider strategy suggested by Kapoor.4
Our primary outcome was body mass
index (BMI) relative to UK reference data
from 1990 as an SD score, taking account of
age and sex specific differences in BMI. BMI
SD score is increasing in British children,
reflecting increased fatness across the distri-
bution.5 Obesity prevention trials examine
differences in the trajectory of increasing
BMI SD score as a test of the efficacy of the
intervention.4 The BMI SD score is also a
practical proxy for body fatness in field stud-
ies and is measured with high precision and
more direct field body composition meas-
ures are inaccurate and imprecise. Body
composition estimates from bioimpedance
in our trial did not suggest any differences
between intervention and control groups,
and we found no significant difference
between groups in waist SD scores.
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Author’s response to influenza
vaccination: policy v evidence
Editor—My analysis was based on 206
studies (several million observations’ worth
of data) included in systematic reviews span-
ning some 40 years. The hypotheses by
Mandl do not fit some of the evidence in the
elderly population.1 He cannot explain how
in years of good matching between vaccine
antigenic content and circulating viruses the
vaccines fail to prevent deaths from all
respiratory diseases in elderly community
dwellers (1.32, 95% confidence interval 1.25
to 1.39, 426 668 observations) while at the
same time preventing 42% (25% to 55%,
404 759 observations) of deaths from all
causes,2 presumably including deaths from
falls, accidental poisoning, accidents, hypo-
thermia, and so on.
Fedson and Nichol deride my choice of
example of poor methodological quality of
a large number of available cohort studies.1
The authors of the studies either did not
know such details or like Fedson and Nichol
thought them irrelevant and would leave a
reader to work them out from “official
records.” Vaccine matching and level of cir-
culating influenza viruses are the most
important predictors of vaccine efficacy and
effectiveness. The closer the match and the
higher the viral circulation, the better the
performance of the vaccine.3 Without such
knowledge it would be very difficult to give
an honest and reliable assessment of the
effects of the vaccine. That is one of the
reasons why these studies are of poor
quality.
I note with worry their statement that
decisions should be made on three of the
most notoriously biased sources of informa-
tion: non-randomised studies, expert opin-
ion, and economic evaluations.4 5 It is
precisely because most comparative evi-
dence on elderly people comes from
non-randomised studies that we are left with
the question: are the effects we witness due
to the vaccines or are they due to confound-
ing? The tone of the response by Fedon and
Nichol (lack of vaccines’ effect in small
children is undoubtedly due to small
numbers and my concern over lack of
vaccine safety data—a statement from which
they omitted the key word “comparative”)
implies that my review seemed to be
questioning a dogma. Heretics like me get
short shrift.
I repeat my statement that especially in
elderly people, an insufficient number of
field trials has been conducted (five, of which
only one has been carried out in the past
decade) to allow reasonable certainty of the
effects of inactivated vaccines. The nature of
the evidence from non-randomised designs
when analysed critically and exhaustively is
weak and contradictory. I repeat my
observation that the totality of safety
evidence from comparative sources (studies
in which a proportion of participants were
contemporaneously exposed or not to the
vaccines) is tiny in small children (35 obser-
vations) and small in the elderly (2963
observations).
Tom Jefferson coordinator
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00061, Italy
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Competing interests: TJ owned shares in Glaxo
SmithKline and received consultancy fees from
Sanofi-Synthelabo (2002) and Roche (1997-
1999).
1 Correspondence. Influenza vaccination: policy versus
evidence. BMJ 2006;333:1020-1. (11 November.)
2 Rivetti D, Demicheli V, Di Pietrantonj C, Jefferson TO,
Thomas R. Vaccines for preventing influenza in the elderly.
Cochrane Database Syst Rev 2006; (3):CD004876.
3 Demicheli V, Rivetti D, Deeks JJ, Jefferson TO. Vaccines for
preventing influenza in healthy adults. Cochrane Database
Syst Rev 2004;(3):CD001269
4 Kunz R, Oxman AD. The unpredictability paradox: review
of empirical comparisons of randomised and non-
randomised clinical trials. BMJ 1998;317;1185-90.
5 Jefferson T, Demicheli V, Vale L. Quality of systematic
reviews of economic evaluations in health care. JAMA
2002;287:2809-12.
Methadone tolerance testing in
drug misusers
Beyond the edge of safety
Editor—The model of methadone toler-
ance testing Bakker and Fazey describe is
not the solution to this problem.1 They make
the assumption that low mean maintenance
doses of methadone are a consequence of
low starting doses, which are separate issues.
The model of induction into methadone
treatment recommended in the national
clinical guidelines for the management of
drug dependence allows for the attainment
of adequate optimised maintenance doses.2
Reluctance on the part of some prescribers
(and patients) to increase doses to the
recommended range between 60 mg and
120 mg a day is the clinical issue needing
further attention.
Bakker and Fazey cite no drug related
deaths during tolerance testing as evidence
of the accuracy of their patients’ estimated
dose of methadone required to relieve with-
drawal. However, this speaks more for the
particular characteristics of the primary care
practice involved, its drug dependent clien-
tele, its prescribers, and the therapeutic and
professional relationships of the key stake-
holders in this model of induction than for
the safety of the methadone tolerance
testing protocol. It therefore cannot be
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extrapolated to other drug treatment set-
tings. Neither large, high volume drug treat-
ment services nor small, less experienced
settings can afford to invest such confidence
in unknown, newly presenting drug users’
own predictions of the “right” methadone
dose for them.
Even with cautious clinical practice dur-
ing the first week of treatment, deaths occur,
of the order of seven deaths per 10 000
inductions, about double that for heroin
users not in treatment.3 Overall, however,
methadone treatment reduces by two thirds
drug users’ risk of death while in treatment.4
Clinicians need to be aware that death
during induction while rare, is preventable
through cautious and responsible practice
that takes account of the known biovigilance
data.5 The practice as outlined by Bakker
and Fazey is well beyond such data and if
practised on a widespread basis will inevita-
bly result in unnecessary deaths.
We think the publication of this paper,
unaccompanied by an independent expert
commentary, is an example of poor editorial
judgment.
Deborah A Zador consultant physician in addictions
South London and Maudsley Foundation Trust,
London SE5 8RS
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Author’s response
Editor—There would be little reason to
perform methadone tolerance testing if it
didn’t seem to attract difficult to engage
addicts and if conventional induction were
really safe. Unfortunately, slow titration may
actually involve a mortality up to seven times
greater than untreated addiction.1 There-
fore, even when complying with the
guidelines, the risks are not minimal; only
the risk of blame is absent. Whether metha-
done tolerance testing is even riskier
remains to be seen. I consider it good prac-
tice to discuss overdose risk and its manage-
ment at the start of treatment, whether using
conventional titration or tolerance testing. I
have no illusions that useful observation
occurs the night after patients have their test
dose, but this is too good an educational
opportunity to miss.
The risk that patients might not return
after a test dose is a real concern, and it
would be better to perform the test
procedure on site. Unfortunately, bureau-
cracy makes keeping methadone on the
premises unattractive, but we hope to
address this soon.
Despite great expansion of treatment
facilities and reduction in waiting times, only
a minority of addicts currently engage in
treatment.2 It seems that very often patients’
motivation is being tested to destruction by
requiring numerous assessments before any
medication is offered. In this way, only “easy”
patients eventually make it through to an
actual prescription: the “difficult” ones (who
actually cause the most trouble to society
and to themselves) are effectively excluded
from treatment and, once again, nobody
blames the services that make life so difficult
for them.
Although early and adequate medica-
tion does not address all the issues, it makes
it easier to address them later because
patients more often keep appointments and
engage with counselling once on mainte-
nance. In no other field of medicine would it
be considered ethical to test patients’
motivation when health and social benefits
are so clear cut. To facilitate entry into treat-
ment, I do indeed offer rapid access but also
choice: I start as many patients on buprenor-
phine as methadone. I also offer community
detoxification and naltrexone implants.
We doubt that clinicians change their
prescribing based only on a relatively small
number of cases. However, our experience
may be useful in some common situations.
For example, the dilemma one faces when a
patient fails to collect medication for a few
days. Some guidelines recommend that the
dose is reduced in this situation, just when
withdrawal begins to bite. A tolerance test
might be a useful alternative.
Surely the editors deserve credit for
publishing this peer encouraged paper,
which may stimulate debate and research.
Adam Bakker general practitioner
Lisson Grove Health Centre, London NW8 8EG
bakker@nhs.net
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Refusing to provide a prenatal
test: can it ever be ethical?
Time to re-think the autonomy of future
individuals
Editor—Dalatycki says that opposition to
prenatal testing is based on the ethical prin-
ciples of confidentiality, and of preserving
the autonomy of the future individual (in
order that they can make the decision once
they have sufficient intellectual and emo-
tional maturity to choose whether to test).1
This view enjoys widespread support if we
are to judge by the quoted guidelines of the
International Huntington Association and
the World Federation of Neurology2 and by
Dalatycki’s observation that all major human
genetic societies recommend against testing
minors for genetic disorders that have their
onset in adulthood and for which no
preventive treatment exists.3 4 I am left won-
dering why this future autonomy principle is
not paramount in the decision of whether to
terminate a healthy pregnancy? Termination
is surely the ultimate loss of autonomy for a
future individual, yet it is legal in this country
and also widely accepted.
If we accept that ethics is the science of
deciding the right thing to do based on rea-
son then this timely article must prompt a
re-think of the ethical principles concerning
unborn children? Are they future individu-
als with rights or not? Ethics introduces the
notions of consistency and reproducibility to
decision making which makes the accepted
views concerning prenatal testing for Hunt-
ington’s disease and concerning so called
“social” termination of pregnancy incompat-
ible. They cannot both be right.
Paul D Kelly general practitioner principal
Highfield Surgery, Blackpool FY4 2LD
pdkelly@lineone.net
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Rights of future children
Editor—Contrary to Duncan and Foddy,1 I
would argue that clinicians who refuse a test
in these circumstances are not being
paternalistic, they are upholding the rights
of a future child over the rights of parents.
The right not to know a genetic diagnosis, or
to decide for oneself when to have a diagno-
sis, is very important, particularly in cases
where there is no cure for a condition.
Nor is it clear why parents may want this
information to assist them in making a deci-
sion about whether to have more children.
Symptoms of Huntington’s disease develop
in adulthood, not childhood, so the status of
the child would not have implications for
parenting. The status of one child has no
implications for the status of any future child
they may have. The implication is that the
parents do not understand risk, or their
other reproduction options.
Clinicians should explain carefully the
grounds on which they take the decision to
refuse testing, in the hope that parents will
come to a similar view. There is always a risk
of parents manipulating the system, just as
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there is with prohibition on social sex selec-
tion, but this is not a reason to relax ethical
guidelines.
Paternalism is not always wrong, particu-
larly when it comes to genetic information
about future people: clinicians often forgo
communicating information which they
could obtain. We are not provided with
genetic printouts at birth, nor are all the
genetic characteristics of a fetus communi-
cated to the potential parents. Long may it
remain so.
Tom W Shakespeare research fellow
Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne
NE1 7RU
t.w.shakespeare@ncl.ac.uk
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The darker side of medicine
Editor—Delatycki seems to suggest that
testing is offered to those parents who have
yet to make a decision as to whether or not
to go through with the preg-
nancy.1 In this situation, how-
ever, if the test is negative
and the parents subsequently
choose to have the baby, has
not the child suffered the
same breach of rights and
confidentiality even though
the result itself is negative?
Surely the ethical implication
is the same.
This makes the idea of
judging the relative autonomy of parents
versus the autonomy of the child seem
rather beside the point. In a system where we
have given parents the precedence to decide
on the right of the child to exist, it is unreal-
istic, as Duncan and Foddy have suggested,1
to set terms on their decision. Despite the
breach of the child’s rights, this is not where
the ethical difficulty stems from—this is no
different from other situations when we as a
profession have to decide on the ascendancy
of rights, such as the rights of the patient
versus public interest. Instead, what Delaty-
cki is suggesting is that we provide this test
only in cases where it validates the medical
profession by allowing it to take further
action in the lives of the parents and future
family. Where our medical knowledge is
powerless to intervene or prevent the inevi-
tability of Huntington’s disease, then the
knowledge of the possibility of that disease is
categorised as potentially harmful and
therefore irrelevant to the parents.
This goes a bit further than mere pater-
nalism or abuse of power. It reveals the
darker side of medical assumption. The
offering of the test is based on the argument
that the medical profession has the right to
control not just the immediate clinical
scenario but the disease entity and its
psychosocial impact. Duncan and Foddy
cannot entirely avoid this either. Both sides
refer to research on the psychological impli-
cations, whether for or against testing. This
underestimates the value that should be
placed on parents themselves having the
right to determine how these factors inform
their decisions. Knowledge is in our power
to divulge, and it is not necessarily up to the
profession to define all of its wider impact.
Nushan P Gunawardana medical student
University College London, London WC1E 6BT
nushan_g@yahoo.co.uk
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Ethics or humanity?
Editor—Huntington’s disease manifests
with cognitive, emotional symptoms, uncon-
trollable and abnormal movements due to
destruction of neurones. There is loss of
thinking, planning, speech, and synchronisa-
tion; the memory is affected, as is muscle
control; psychological imbalances occur,
and much more. Such patients face death
more often due to complications of the dis-
ease than the disease itself; one of those is
succumbing to the disorder
by committing suicide. It is
an adult onset disease, but
juvenile Huntington’s disease
occurs in young children.
In autosomal dominant
people the possibility of
bearing affected progeny is
50%. Which parent who
knows all this and is affected
by the disease would want a
baby, who might not even
live a normal life till middle age?1 The emo-
tions and concerns of a parent cannot be
termed paternalism in a disapproving sense.
A baby is a part of the mother’s body. She
has the right to decide her unborn child’s
future. Where does she defy or disobey eth-
ics? It is a doctor’s moral and ethical duty to
explain to the couple all possible conse-
quences of a pregnancy during antenatal
follow-ups, and to do this even more
carefully if genetic disorders are suspected.
The couple should be informed about tests
to diagnose disorders in their baby, espe-
cially if the baby may be born with an incur-
able and potentially lethal condition. And
the decision to terminate or continue the
pregnancy once the outcome is known
should also lie with the parents to be.
Neha S Godre intern
Lokmanya Tilak Municipal General Hospital, Sion,
Mumbai 400022, Maharashtra, India
neha_godre@rediffmail.com
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Even clinician led management
won’t fix the NHS
Editor—Although I echo Flook’s personal
view and have argued similarly for many
years,1 2 I suspect that until governments
agree not to set political targets by which
healthcare provision is measured, even clini-
cian led management will fail. The NHS was
charged originally with providing the best
available health care to the whole popula-
tion, according to need, free at source. In a
changing environment with financial con-
straints, the challenge for us all is to match
practice to purpose, and to achieve this,
resources must be allocated having priori-
tised the critical elements necessary to
provide a measured response to the
perceived need. And so everything turns on
the definition of “need” and who defines it.
Too many of the decisions concerning
the allocation of medical resources are made
for the wrong reasons, using the wrong
criteria, by the wrong people. Our profes-
sion has abrogated responsibility over these
vital decisions to people who should not be
making them. We don’t allow the care of
individual patients to be defined solely in
terms of finance, yet we seem content to
allow the strategy for caring for large
numbers of patients to be decided on this
criterion alone.
We need management at all levels in the
NHS to be undertaken by doctors trained in
the necessary core skills to do the job well.
Managing medical resources is part of deliv-
ering medical care. Politicians and adminis-
trators can ignore detail and seem to get
away with it. Doctors and nurses cannot:
they talk to patients every day, share their
lives and deaths, win their trust and interact
in the most intimate ways with people at
their most vulnerable and, therefore, they
are unlikely to forget the purpose of the
NHS and the services it provides. But
arguably more important than the need for
doctors to enter NHS management, is the
need for them to enter politics at all levels
and in all parties, so that they can influence
NHS policy and strategy. In difficult times,
quality of care will be maintained and even
improved only if medical resources are
managed by clinicians, and NHS policy is
influenced and formed by clinicians in
government.
Adam R Greenbaum consultant plastic surgeon
St Thomas’ Hospital, London SE1
adam@elestar.co.uk
Competing interests: None declared.
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